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Security: rakib78has/AccessScan

Security

docs/security.md

Security and privacy

Permissions

Permission Why
activeTab Temporary access to the tab the user clicked SiteCheck on
scripting Inject the scanner into that tab
storage Keep the last scan per tab in chrome.storage.session

None of these produces a permission warning at install.

SiteCheck never declares host_permissions, optional_host_permissions, content_scripts or externally_connectable. scripts/validate-build.mjs fails any build that does, or that requests a permission outside the allowlist above. Widening the allowlist requires updating this document first.

The end-to-end test build (dist-e2e/) adds http://127.0.0.1/* so Playwright can scan the local fixture server. It is built to a separate folder, and the validator rejects it, so it cannot be released by mistake.

Data handling

  • Nothing leaves the browser. SiteCheck makes no network requests and has no analytics.
  • Scan results are kept in chrome.storage.session: Chrome clears it when the browser closes, and SiteCheck removes a tab's entry when the tab closes. Page scripts and content scripts cannot read it.
  • Stored page URLs keep only origin and path. Query strings, fragments and embedded credentials, which can carry tokens, are dropped before storage.
  • Each finding keeps at most 50 elements, with HTML snippets cut to 300 characters.
  • Logs contain error codes only, never page content or URLs.
  • Exports are created in the popup and saved through the browser's own download, with no downloads permission and no upload. They contain page content (HTML snippets, selectors) and the page URL without its query string, so treat exported files as you would the page.

The CSV protection's known trade-off: a cell that legitimately begins with - or + (such as -5) is exported as '-5. Correctness of a spreadsheet formula is never worth the risk.

Threat model (summary)

Threat Control Status
Page content rendered as HTML (XSS in popup) React text nodes only; ESLint bans dangerouslySetInnerHTML and innerHTML assignment; component test SC-UI-004 Active
javascript: or other unsafe help links Only https: help URLs survive normalization and validation Active
Spoofed extension messages Accepted only from SiteCheck's own extension pages (id and URL checked); other extensions and content scripts are ignored Active
Malformed messages or scanner output Runtime guards on every message and on the scanner result; stored state is re-validated when read Active
Page-derived selectors used for highlighting Passed to the page as serialized args and used only with querySelector; invalid ones report "not found" (SC-UI-005) Active
Help links opening attacker-controlled pages https: only, opened with rel="noopener noreferrer" Active
Page tampering with the scanner The scanner runs in the extension's isolated world, out of reach of page scripts Active
Remote or dynamic code Default MV3 CSP; build validator rejects CSP loosening; ESLint bans eval; axe-core is bundled, never fetched Active
Over-broad access activeTab only, enforced by the build validator Active
Secrets in the package Build validator rejects .pem, .crx and .env files Active
Compromised CI dependency npm ci from the lockfile; exact dependency versions; actions pinned to commit SHAs; read-only token Active
Spreadsheet formula injection in CSV exports Cells starting with =, +, -, @, tab or carriage return get a leading ' (OWASP); every field quoted (SC-SEC-002) Active
Unsafe characters in download file names Host reduced to a-z 0-9 . -, capped at 60 characters; fixed sitecheck-… prefix (SC-UNIT-015) Active

Security review (Milestone 7, 2026-10-10)

What was checked, and the evidence:

Area Finding Evidence
Network Scanning, highlighting and exporting make no network requests. SC-SEC-003 records every request during a full session; a positive control proves the recorder works
axe-core stylesheet download axe can re-fetch page stylesheets for a few CSS rules (preload). Now explicitly off. src/scanner/entry.ts; SC-SEC-003
Dynamic code in our bundles None. The popup's only fetch was Vite's module-preload polyfill, now disabled. validate-build.mjs fails any build whose popup or worker contains eval, new Function, fetch, XMLHttpRequest, WebSocket or sendBeacon
Dynamic code in axe-core axe contains new Function (templates, plugin loading) in paths SiteCheck does not use. Chrome blocks string evaluation in the scanner's isolated world, so they could not run anyway. SC-SEC-004 gets EvalError from that world
Content Security Policy Chrome's default also trusts http://localhost:* and http://127.0.0.1:*. SiteCheck now declares script-src 'self'; object-src 'self', and the validator requires it. SC-UNIT-001, SC-UNIT-002, SC-SEC-005
Dependencies npm audit: 0 vulnerabilities. Every version pinned exactly; fflate added for packaging only (build time, not shipped). package.json, package-lock.json
CI and release Third-party actions pinned to commit SHAs; read-only token except the release job's contents: write; tag and version taken from environment variables, never interpolated into scripts. actionlint 1.7.12 reports no problems. .github/workflows/
Packaging The store zip is built only from a validated build, leaves out source maps, and is reproducible (identical bytes from the same commit) with a SHA-256 checksum. SC-UNIT-016; CI's checksum step

Pre-release security checklist

Run through this before every tag; record anything unusual in the release notes.

  • npm audit reports no known vulnerabilities, or each is assessed and noted.
  • The permissions table above still matches manifest.config.ts; no new permission or host access without updating this document first.
  • npm run validate:build passes (permissions, CSP, forbidden code, secrets).
  • The full CI pipeline passed on the commit being tagged.
  • The regression suite's expected files are unchanged, or every change was reviewed.
  • No secrets, keys or .env files in the repository or package (git ls-files | grep -iE '\.(pem|crx|env)$' prints nothing).
  • Manual checks SC-MAN-001 and SC-MAN-002 done on the release build in desktop Chrome.
  • The Chrome Web Store listing's privacy answers still match "Data handling" above.

Known risks

  • Chrome reports injection failures only as message text, which SiteCheck classifies by pattern. If Chrome rewords a message, the user sees the generic "scan failed" text rather than the specific one. Nothing unsafe follows from a misclassification.

There aren't any published security advisories