Please do not open a public issue for security problems. Email soni.mil2001@gmail.com with the details (or use GitHub's private vulnerability reporting on this repo if enabled). You'll get a response as soon as possible, normally within a few days.
- The harness server binds 127.0.0.1 only. Packaged builds allow anonymous loopback reads, but public mutations require either the desktop's private per-launch capability or a paired session; built-in agent integrations use narrower per-turn capabilities. Anything that makes it reachable from off-machine without a paired session, lets one bot reuse another turn's capability, or lets a local unprivileged other user drive it is a vulnerability.
- API keys live in
~/.openmausbot/config.jsonand are write-only through the API (configuredbooleans out, never values). Any path that echoes a stored secret back — API response, SSE event, log line, argv visible inps— is a vulnerability. - Agents run real CLIs (
claude,codex) with the user's own privileges, and the permission broker is the consent layer for risky actions. Bypasses of the broker (approving without a user decision, spoofing the broker socket) are vulnerabilities unless that bot is explicitly set to Full access. Full access is a standing user decision to approve provider permission requests; it must never answer questions or silently broaden product-level confirmations such as credentials, routines, skills, or peer communication. - Spawning must never route user-influenced strings through a shell. Report any
shell: true/cmd.exestring-building you find.