LCORE-3386: align prompt guardrails spec with the shipped shield-based design - #2655
LCORE-3386: align prompt guardrails spec with the shipped shield-based design#2655max-svistunov wants to merge 4 commits into
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WalkthroughThe design document now reflects the shipped ChangesPrompt guardrails design
Estimated code review effort: 1 (Trivial) | ~5 minutes Merge Risk: 🟡 Moderate · up to The design permits Guardian credentials to be sent while TLS certificate verification is disabled, which could expose the API key to an impersonated endpoint. The TLS constraint should be made explicit before merge. 🚥 Pre-merge checks | ✅ 7✅ Passed checks (7 passed)
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Inline comments:
In `@docs/design/prompt-guardrails/prompt-guardrails.md`:
- Line 354: Update the “Runbook / oncall implications” heading to use the
correctly hyphenated “Runbook / on-call implications”; leave the surrounding
content unchanged.
- Line 187: When implementing the Granite Guardian client, enforce the TLS
credential rule around the verify_ssl and api_key configuration: require
certificate verification or a trusted CA bundle whenever api_key is set, and
reject configurations that disable verification while supplying the key. Allow
verify_ssl false only when no api_key is configured.
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- GitHub Check: E2E: library / ci / default
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- GitHub Check: Red Hat Konflux / lightspeed-core-0-8-enterprise-contract / lightspeed-stack-0-8
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docs/design/prompt-guardrails/prompt-guardrails.md
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docs/design/prompt-guardrails/prompt-guardrails.md
[grammar] ~354-~354: Ensure spelling is correct
Context: ...rtup validation error. ### Runbook / oncall implications New alert: guardian error...
(QB_NEW_EN_ORTHOGRAPHY_ERROR_IDS_1)
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docs/design/prompt-guardrails/prompt-guardrails.md (1)
5-5: LGTM!Also applies to: 9-9, 11-21, 25-183, 188-244, 248-284, 291-352, 356-441, 451-451
…d design The prompt guardrails spec described a standalone `guardrails:` config section with separate detectors and rules, a `src/guardrails/` package, a `DetectorBackend` protocol and a structured `ScreeningItem` payload. The detector framework that shipped under LCORE-3389 (PR lightspeed-core#2580) took a different route: Granite Guardian is a shield type in the existing `shields:` list, configured through `GraniteGuardianShieldConfiguration`, `GraniteGuardianConfig` and `RiskDefinition`, and evaluated by an `AbstractSafetyCapability`. The spec was not updated at the time, so the tickets implementing the input and output points were being reviewed against a design that no longer matched the code. Rewrite the What, Requirements, Architecture, acceptance test surface, aspect-specific concerns and implementation suggestions sections to describe the shipped design: the shield's risk selection by point, the Granite Guardian 4.1 judge prompt, logprob-based scoring against the per-risk threshold, the two evaluation paths (run_shield_moderation_v2 before RAG on the Responses-based endpoints, agent capabilities on the agent-based endpoints), and the fail-closed error handling as implemented. Keep the requirements that still apply and name the ticket that covers each open one: concurrent evaluation and per-risk latency (LCORE-3390), advisory risks via a new `blocking` flag and streaming checkpoints (LCORE-3391), the validation-error metric that currently has no callers (LCORE-4089), and skipping RAG, the main LLM call and the topic-summary call for input-blocked requests on /v1/query and /v1/streaming_query (LCORE-4090). R6 is extended to cover topic-summary calls and RAG documents in the response, because the in-agent path currently returns both for blocked queries. Move capabilities of the original design that the shipped configuration does not provide into a new "Deferred from the original design" section: the separate config section and backend protocol, the openai_moderations and llama_stack_shields backends, out-of-the-box risk ids, the boolean verdict without a threshold, fail-open and refusal-shaped detector failures, api_key_path, the concurrent input execution mode and a global violation message. Record model selection and guardian token accounting as open questions, note that the `enable_thinking` docstring points at a `ModerationConfig.thinking_enabled` setting that does not exist, and add a changelog row explaining the revision.
Advisory (non-blocking) risks were listed as requirement R4e, to be added under LCORE-3391 through a new `blocking` flag on RiskDefinition. Ask Red Hat, the consumer the output point was designed around, runs blocking-only screening, and no current consumer needs risks that record an outcome without altering the response. LCORE-3391 now covers block and pass only. Remove R4e and its acceptance-test row, drop the `blocking` flag from the key-files table, stop tying the tool point's behaviour to a per-risk blocking posture, and list advisory risks under "Deferred from the original design" together with the one field needed to add them later.
… the guardrails spec Two review nits on the spec realignment: - The configuration example now states that verify_ssl must not be false when api_key is set. The Granite Guardian client sends the key as a bearer token, so disabling certificate validation on a credentialed endpoint would let an on-path attacker capture it. The constraint is documented here so the client implementation enforces it. - "Runbook / oncall implications" is spelled "on-call".
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…entation The approved implementation of the input guardrail point (PR lightspeed-core#2646) changed three things the spec still described as gaps or open questions: - GraniteGuardianConfig gained a `model` field (default ibm-granite/granite-guardian-4.1-8b), so the model name sent to the inference server is configurable. The judge prompt remains built for the 4.1 format, so the open question narrows to supporting other Guardian versions, which need a version-specific prompt. - Risks at a point are checked in parallel batches of `batch_size` (default 3, 1-10) rather than one at a time, and the remaining batches are skipped once a batch flags. Batching was chosen over unbounded parallelism because internal guardian gateways rate-limit. Per-risk latency is logged. - The shield caches its model and HTTP client per configuration, so the client is created once and reused instead of per request. Update R4 and R10, the configuration example and field list, the shield section (model, concurrency, client lifecycle), the latency discussion, the acceptance-test row and test pattern for concurrency, the key-files table and the open questions, and add a changelog row.
Description
Aligns the prompt guardrails spec (
docs/design/prompt-guardrails/prompt-guardrails.md) with the design that actually shipped.The spec described a standalone
guardrails:config section with separate detectors and rules, asrc/guardrails/package and aDetectorBackendprotocol. The detector framework merged under LCORE-3389 (#2580) instead makes Granite Guardian a shield type in the existingshields:list (GraniteGuardianShieldConfiguration,GraniteGuardianConfig,RiskDefinition). The spec was not updated then, so the input and output point tickets were being reviewed against a design that no longer matched the code.What changes:
run_shield_moderation_v2before RAG on/v1/responsesand/rlsapi; agent capabilities on/v1/queryand/v1/streaming_query).blockingflag and streaming checkpoints (LCORE-3391), the validation-error metric, which currently has no callers (LCORE-4089), and skipping RAG / main LLM / topic summary for input-blocked requests on the agent-based endpoints (LCORE-4090).openai_moderationsandllama_stack_shieldsbackends, out-of-the-box risk ids, a threshold-less boolean verdict, fail-open and refusal-shaped detector failures,api_key_path, the concurrent input execution mode and a global violation message.enable_thinkingdocstring references aModerationConfig.thinking_enabledsetting that does not exist; a changelog row.Type of change
pyproject.toml+uv.lock]requirements.*.txtfor Konflux]Tools used to create PR
Related Tickets & Documents
Checklist before requesting a review
Testing
Documentation only; no code changes.
main:src/models/config.py(RiskDefinition,GraniteGuardianConfig,GraniteGuardianShieldConfiguration,ShieldConfigurationunion)src/utils/shields.py(run_shield_moderation_v2, stubbedrun_shield_moderation),src/utils/pydantic_ai_helpers.py(_shield_capability),src/app/endpoints/query.pyandstreaming_query.py(RAG before the agent run)${env.*}substitution:src/configuration.py; shields listing:src/app/endpoints/shields.pygit grep record_llm_validation_error src/prompt-guardrails-spike.md,../../user_doc/shields_guide.md,../../../CLAUDE.md(checked before commit).Summary by CodeRabbit