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chore: merge upstream Dokploy v0.31.2 - #281
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mv swapped the inode, leaving containers that bind-mount the file (e.g. CrowdSec template) reading a stale/deleted file.
…rial Going back to the plan step after starting a trial only offered "Start trial", which failed with "already have an active plan or trial", leaving users stuck. Show the active plan/trial with a Continue button, and hide the trial button once the trial has been used.
…-orphan-job fix(schedules): prevent cron jobs from being lost on cloud
fix(terminal): close SSH sessions when the terminal WebSocket closes
…nd auth Hardens authorization and input containment found in a source audit. - shared assertServerAccess guard (org + accessedServers; rejects the local control-plane host on Cloud) applied to network, destination, registry, certificate, ai.deploy, docker/volume/image, swarm, cluster and settings - getRemoteDocker fails closed when the target server has no SSH key - bind path inputs to their owner: unzipDrop (zip-slip), patch repo file/dir read, backup object key, and volume restore (+ strict backupFileName) - domain.create authorizes every service id regardless of domainType - git-provider update (github/gitlab/gitea/bitbucket) checks provider ownership - notification update binds the channel sub-record id to the notification - backup web-server restore and service-less backup ops are owner/admin and org-bound - listen-deployment binds the requested logPath to an authorized deployment - github webhook pull_request closed scopes preview removal to the verified provider - gitea/gitlab OAuth callbacks require a session whose org owns the provider - SSRF: metrics endpoints, compose template baseUrl and AI model fetch go through providerFetch - apps/api and apps/schedules fail closed when API_KEY is unset - better-auth: member role/invite only via tRPC (+ admin-role ceiling), API-key sessions fail closed without a membership row, and reset/verification links use the canonical host instead of the request Host header Adds role-based regression tests (owner/admin/member/custom) covering both preserved legitimate access and blocked escalation.
- git providers: update the stored provider, not the client-supplied id - web-server backups: bind one/update/remove/manual run to the org's destination - compose restore: accept the service backup folder, reject '..' - listen-deployment: authorize backup, volume backup and schedule logs - traefik settings and network actions: enforce accessed servers - patch repo: read files from the git tree so symlinks can't reach host files - volume restore: bind volume and server to the service, run tar without a shell string - reset email origin: honor the https setting
…run-1 # Conflicts: # apps/schedules/src/index.ts
…p names - volume restore also accepts volumes the service already backs up, covering compose volumes with an explicit or external name - backup restore rejects '..' path segments instead of any two dots
fix(security): enforce org/role boundaries across routers, webhooks and auth
…hell appName and organizationId are no longer accepted from schedule create/update input, and the schedule paths used in rm/mkdir/script writes are shell-quoted so rows stored before this fix stay harmless.
removeFileOrDirectory and removeDirectoryIfExistsContent ran an unquoted rm -rf, so a file mount filePath like x$(cmd) executed on the host when the mount was removed. Use fs.rm instead.
The rclone destination was double-quoted (still expands $(...)), the retention path was unquoted and compose serviceName went raw into the docker ps filter. Also block web-server backups on cloud, where the retention cleanup ran on the shared host, and stop logging the backup command (it carries DB passwords).
…pName appName is no longer accepted from input, serviceName must be a valid service name, and prefix/serviceName/paths are shell-quoted in the backup, retention and cleanup commands.
The new password (backticks allowed by DATABASE_PASSWORD_REGEX) sat in double quotes and databaseUser / stored credentials were unquoted or single-quoted. Pass every docker exec argument through quote().
dockerfile, build paths, dockerContextPath, publishDirectory and dropBuildPath must be safe relative paths (no spaces, leading '-' or '..'); dockerBuildStage, railpackVersion and herokuVersion are restricted to [a-zA-Z0-9._-]. They were interpolated unquoted into the builder shell commands.
…mands composePath went unquoted into cat (remote), double-quoted into the base64 write and, via the docker command, into the double-quoted log banner echo. Restrict it to a safe relative path and quote those sinks.
…rSettings Any authenticated user could read the host SSH private key and the metrics token. The key is never returned now, and the metrics token is only returned to owners and admins.
apiUpdateUser was the full partial insert schema, so a user could set server-managed columns on their own row (stripeCustomerId, serversQuantity, banned, role, ...). Only accept what the profile form sends.
…s organizations project.update accepted organizationId, environment.update accepted projectId and the service update schemas accepted environmentId; move never checked targetEnvironmentId; project.duplicate cloned any service id. Narrow the update schemas, check the target environment's org (and member access) in every move, and authorize each service before duplicating it.
…zation to servers server.create and server.update stored any sshKeyId without checking which organization owns the key.
…nd bind compose.readLogs killProcess, removeDeployment and readLogs only checked application and compose deployments; backup, volume backup, preview and schedule deployments had no check. Reuse the owner resolution from listen-deployment (now a shared helper), require owner/admin for serviceless deployments, only kill running deployments, and make compose.readLogs verify the container belongs to the compose.
…ccess fix(security): scope host schedule reads and the deployment queue
fix(security): refuse file mount and patch writes that escape through a symlink
…ccess fix(security): restrict GitLab/Gitea OAuth connect to provider editors and add state
fix(security): require service access to read application monitoring stats
fix(security): guard AI provider requests against SSRF
fix(security): only fetch metrics from the organization's monitoring endpoints
…-invitation fix(security): refuse changing the profile email to one with a pending invitation
…me-mount fix(security): members can't attach an existing Docker volume that isn't their service's
🚀 Release v0.31.1
Create Server gets a "Run a command" tab: Dokploy generates an SSH key and a signed, single-use token; running the command on the VPS installs the key and registers the server. Complete setup then opens the Setup Server modal.
Start over only clears the pending command; deleting keys from server.create could remove unrelated SSH keys.
* feat(servers): connect a server by running one command
…ostgres 100-arg limit
…g-limit fix(previews): limit application columns when closing a PR to avoid postgres 100-arg limit
…takeover fix(auth): require impersonation consent and rate limit cloud API keys
🚀 Release v0.31.2
Merges upstream tags v0.31.1 and v0.31.2 (82 commits since v0.31.0, the base of the previous sync). Most are security fixes: organization and role boundaries across routers, webhooks and auth; shell quoting of database password changes, backup prefixes, volume backup names, compose paths, log paths and schedule app names; validation of build fields, domain paths and composePath; symlink escapes in file mounts and patches; SSRF guards for AI providers, templates and notification webhooks; SSH keys, registry passwords, webhook tokens and rollback contexts no longer returned to roles that cannot use them; API key creation bound to the "Access to API" permission; impersonation consent. Two features come along: project export and import between instances, and connecting a server with one command. 88 files conflicted. Where both sides fixed the same thing, the fork's mechanism stays (its redaction of secrets for every role, quoting through quoteShellArg, rclone credentials in env, signed OAuth state bound to the session, password changes through the service spec, Swarm convergence waits, outbound requests through utils/undici on Bun) and upstream's extra checks are added on top. Fork changes on top of upstream: - projectExportImport.export is refused to API keys: the bundle holds every secret of the project, encrypted with a passphrase the caller picks. - A server connected by command goes through assertServerDestinationAllowed, since its address comes from forwarding headers. - The sidecar API key checks compare in constant time. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
- Biome import order in the server router and connect-server. - bun.lock: the fast-xml-parser override floor from upstream. - destination.testConnection: "none" from the cloud form's server picker means no server again; since the merge the server check runs in every mode, and an API client that sent "none" to a self-hosted panel got UNAUTHORIZED. - ssh-key test: sshKey.all no longer loads the private key column at all. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Fork tests follow the rules the merge brought in, and upstream's new tests follow the fork's design: - API key sessions: validateRequest caches its answer per request, so each case builds its own request; a request validated twice verifies once. - Deployments that belong to no service (server setup, host schedule runs) need owner or admin to read, kill or remove; members get cases that prove the refusal and the filtered queue. - Profile email: a pending, unexpired invitation blocks the change, an expired one does not. - Vault: with a kept token, changing the URL or the mount is refused. - member-role-ceiling (upstream): only the owner grants admin in the fork. - Traefik recreate: the new order (create, stop, rename, start), still without a sleep and never binding port 80; a restore waits for a running update in the same queue. - terminal-ssh-lifecycle (upstream): rewritten to the fork's terminals (the server terminal destroys a pending connection after 3 s, the container terminal keeps its connection for the hangup scans). - Mocks for assertServerAccess, providerFetch, assertHostScheduleAccess and the version read from package.json instead of a hard-coded one. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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Зачем
Форк брал upstream последний раз 5 ноября (v0.31.0, #186). С тех пор вышли v0.31.1 и v0.31.2: 82 коммита, почти все — исправления безопасности. Этот PR вливает тег
v0.31.2коммитом слияния: второй родитель — сам тег, поэтомуgit merge-baseдля следующей синхронизации останется верным. Вливать нужно merge-коммитом, не squash, иначе база снова «соврёт».Что приходит из upstream
user.updateменяет только поля профиля; создание API-ключа требует права «Access to API»; встроенные эндпоинты better-auth для ключей и смены ролей выключены; вход под другим пользователем требует его согласия.composePath, путь сборки, стадия и версии сборщиков, путь домена (без$), путь логов,appNameрасписаний; удаление файла монтирования без shell; выход по симлинку при записи файлов монтирования и патчей.fetch; шаблоны с чужого адреса — только с правомservice:create.fullContextоткатов не попадает в списки деплоев.compose.readLogsпривязан к сервису; деплои без сервиса (настройка сервера, задачи хоста) читает, останавливает и удаляет только владелец или админ; метрики — только с эндпоинтов своей организации.Как разрешены конфликты
Конфликтовало 88 файлов. Где обе стороны чинили одно и то же, остался механизм форка, а проверки upstream добавлены сверху; ничего из проверок обеих сторон не выброшено (отдельно сверено: все удалённые строки с проверками доступа, экранированием и маскировкой заменены эквивалентом). Остались механизмы форка: маскировка секретов для всех ролей и
reveal*-процедуры,quoteShellArg, ключи rclone в окружении, подписанное состояние OAuth GitLab/Gitea с привязкой к сессии, смена паролей баз через спецификацию сервиса, ожидание сходимости Swarm, исходящие запросы черезutils/undiciна Bun, никакого порта 80.Не взяты, потому что в форке строже: cookie-состояние OAuth upstream, команды смены пароля upstream, назначение админа админом (в форке — только владелец), обход
assertMonitoringAccessдля любого, у кого есть чтение Docker. Не взяты ослабления upstream (вынесены на решение отдельно): бэкап томов compose, объявленных только в compose-файле, и имена сервисов compose с.или-в начале.Добавлено поверх upstream
projectExportImport.exportнедоступен ключам API: архив содержит все секреты проекта, зашифрованные паролем, который выбирает вызывающий, так что владелец ключа расшифровал бы его у себя.assertServerDestinationAllowed: его адрес берётся из заголовков пересылки.apps/apiиapps/schedulesсравнивается за постоянное время.destination.testConnection:"none"из выбора сервера снова означает «без сервера».CLAUDE.md: новые функции и правило доступа к логам деплоев без сервиса.Миграций нет. Зависимости не менялись, кроме нижней границы
fast-xml-parser(5.12) вoverrides.Проверки
Linux, Bun 1.4.4, Node 26.13.0 (VM):
bun install --frozen-lockfile,bun audit --audit-level=moderate,biome ci .(0 ошибок),bun run server:build,bun run typecheckпроходят.backup-files > getBackupServerId, известный таймаут 5 с под нагрузкой всего набора (отдельно проходит).Что проверить на панели
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