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Security: 0ctave/ward

Security

SECURITY.md

Security policy

Ward authenticates login, sudo and polkit by face. This document states what it does and does not protect against, and how to report a vulnerability. Please read the threat model before filing a security issue — several "bypasses" are known and documented limits, not bugs.

Reporting a vulnerability

Do not open a public issue for a security bug. Use GitHub's private vulnerability reporting (the Report a vulnerability button under the repository's Security tab), which opens a private advisory visible only to the maintainers.

Please include: the ward version (ward --version), your distro and camera module, and the steps to reproduce. If the report involves a presentation attack (photo, screen, mask), a short video or the recorded frames (ward lab --record-frames) helps enormously.

We aim to acknowledge within a few days and to fix confirmed, in-scope issues before any public disclosure. There is no bug-bounty program.

The guarantee that must never break: fail open

Every authentication failure — a dark or busy camera, no match, a suspected spoof, a timeout, a crash in the engine, a stuck daemon — must fall through to the password prompt. A bug that locks a user out is treated as the most serious class of defect here, ahead of any false-accept concern. The PAM module enforces its own deadline and never returns "authenticated" on an error path. If you find a way to make ward deny a login rather than fall back to the password, that is in scope and important.

Threat model

Ward is strong convenience with a password fallback, in the same class as Windows Hello on the same 2D camera — not the class of Face ID (which has a depth sensor) or a hardware security key.

In scope (report these):

  • A path where authentication does not fail open (a lockout, or auth granted on an error).
  • Privilege escalation: anything that runs attacker-controlled code as root through the PAM module, the ward-auth helper, the resident daemon (ward.service), the pkexec paths used by the app, or install.sh/packaging.
  • The resident daemon's socket accepting a request from a non-root process, or one attempt's state leaking into another.
  • Secret handling: the sealed keyring credential, PAM_AUTHTOK, or the model store (0600) being exposed to a non-root user.
  • A presentation attack that also defeats the full stack — see below for what each layer does.

Out of scope (known, documented limits of a 2D sensor):

  • Identical twins and strong look-alikes. No 2D face system, Windows Hello included, stops these. Mitigate with require_rgb_match, a tight certainty, and measuring the relative in ward lab.
  • A high-quality printed IR photograph: a 2D system cannot fully distinguish it. The anti-spoof layers raise the bar but do not claim to defeat a determined, well-resourced attacker.
  • Coercion (being forced to look at the camera). Face unlock cannot defend against this; use the password/lock-out, and keep the password fallback strong.
  • A false-accept rate (FAR). Ward does not yet claim a calibrated FAR — that needs a lab study with other subjects (roadmap). Do not treat it as certified.

How the layers actually work (so a "bypass" is assessed correctly)

A single trick that fools one layer is usually not a system bypass:

  • Recogniser decides who, not whether it's real. Fooling it needs a look-alike or a photo of the enrolled person — and that photo still has to pass liveness.
  • Cross-spectrum (IR) is the real anti-replay: a phone/monitor emits ~no infrared, so a replayed face is absent from the IR frame and the attempt FAILs. This is why ward uses an IR camera.
  • Anti-spoof CNN catches the physical artifacts of a camera filming a screen or print (moiré, reflection, lack of depth). It does not flag a digitally re-encoded image — verified by ward benchmark redteam — so it is a complement to the IR layer, not a replacement.
  • A suspected spoof (a liveness FAIL from cross-spectrum / shadow / CNN) ends the attempt. An optional spoof lock-out (off by default, since a lockout only creates denial-of-service while the password always works) can pause face unlock after repeated spoofs — sudo ward tune security.lockout_failures N turns it on.

You can measure these yourself: ward benchmark lfw (impostor rate, recogniser), ward benchmark spoof (APCER/BPCER, CNN), ward benchmark ir (cross-spectrum PAD), and ward benchmark redteam (digital attacks on your own frames).

Supported versions

Ward is pre-1.0; only the latest released version receives security fixes.

There aren't any published security advisories