Register as a producer
Publish anchors for your own signed trust records under your own key. The conventions, naming, and submission path are documented in the repository.
Read the contributor guide →The runtime does not forward a denied call to the tool server.
Check signed evidence against trusted keys, expected policy, and the required attestation level.
Publish commitments and verify inclusion under signed checkpoints. Independent witness receipts add an external observation; they do not certify the record's claims.
A separate agent-to-agent path narrows delegated authority and links provenance across hops.
Historical snapshot at 4697f2c: two demonstration entries, one checkpoint, and 225 passing tests. These figures are not live counters. Check the repository for subsequent entries and test results.
Two published entries and one checkpoint, counted at registry commit ee57e71. Neither entry is production evidence. Checkpoint 1 has a separately fetched, offline-verified external receipt. PyPI currently publishes trace-verify 0.3.1; the witness receipt tool and its dependency lock are in the registry repository.
The scheduled anchor pipeline emits a signed checkpoint carrying the log's size and root plus the previous checkpoint's size and root. That chained pair is what lets a third party check that each checkpoint extends the last rather than replaces it.
+The scheduled anchor pipeline emits a signed checkpoint carrying the log's size and root plus the previous checkpoint's size and root. A verifier checks predecessor linkage and the MMR consistency proof, then recomputes the covered entries. Equality of the previous size and root alone does not prove append-only growth.
Checkpoint 1's signing-body digest is included under a Merkle root signed by a separately operated witness. The returned receipt and two independently fetched copies agree; verification runs offline against an explicitly pinned witness key. This was demonstrated on September 7, 2026, ahead of the September 9 briefing.
+The response reports countersigned-observed. That grade is unsigned response metadata. The receipt has no signed witness timestamp and does not certify registry continuity. It authenticates inclusion of the signing-body digest, with the registry signature checked separately.
No recurring witness submission, reciprocal witnessing, or second witness is claimed. Parallel independent witnesses remain a deployment choice; original records stay with their holders.
+ Receipt, key provenance and offline verification +A witness attesting to more than it checked is worse than no witness. That principle is why the limits above are on this page instead of in a footnote, why the entry counts here are the real ones, and why an external receipt will be announced when it verifies rather than when it is arranged.
A witness attesting to more than it checked is worse than no witness. That principle is why the limits above are on this page instead of in a footnote, why the entry counts here are the real ones, and why the receipt announcement names exactly which properties were verified.
Publish anchors for your own signed trust records under your own key. The conventions, naming, and submission path are documented in the repository.
Read the contributor guide →Single-operator dependency is a weakness we name rather than hide. Independent mirrors and independent witnesses both remove it, and both are open to anyone.
Mirroring guide →Single-operator dependency is a weakness we name rather than hide. Independent mirrors and independent witnesses can reduce it when observers retain and compare evidence. Neither is a blanket guarantee against split views.
Mirroring guide →The most useful contribution is a demonstration that something on this page overstates what the code actually does. Open an issue in public.
Open an issue →